The Emperor Has No Clothes, part 6
Preceding installments of this series have traced John
Harrington’s involvement with the Sox since 1970. Now
it’s time to sum up: how does Harrington’s
performance compare to his predecessors – and what does his
continued control portend for the future?
To make the comparison easier I’ve divided recent Sox
history into three eras: the final decade of Tom Yawkey’s
rule (1967-76), the Jean Yawkey-LeRoux-Sullivan years (1977-86),
and the years of Harrington’s effective control
(1987-present). The accompanying tables show the Sox’
fortunes, on the field and off, since 1967.
TABLE 1: The Final Yawkey Years
Year |
Record |
Final Position |
Attendance |
Rank |
Media $ |
Rank |
1967 |
92-70 |
Lost World Series |
1,727,832 |
1st |
$690,000 |
7th |
1968 |
86-76 |
4th in AL |
1,940,788 |
2nd |
$689,000 |
8th |
1969 |
87-75 |
3rd in AL East |
1,833,426 |
1st |
$690,000 |
9th |
1970 |
87-75 |
3rd in AL East |
1,595,278 |
1st |
$700,000 |
8th |
1971 |
85-77 |
3rd in AL East |
1,678,732 |
1st |
$700,000 |
8th |
1972 |
85-70 |
2nd in AL East |
1,441,718 |
2nd |
$700,000 |
9th |
1973 |
89-73 |
2nd in AL East |
1,481,002 |
2nd |
$1,000,000 |
3rd |
1974 |
84-78 |
3rd in AL East |
1,556,411 |
1st |
$1,000,000 |
2nd |
1975 |
95-65 |
Lost World Series |
1,748,587 |
1st |
$1,500,000 |
1st |
1976 |
83-79 |
3rd in AL East |
1,895.846 |
2nd |
$2,000,000 |
1st |
During Tom Yawkey’s final decade, the Sox were the third
most successful team in the American League, behind the Baltimore
and Oakland dynasties. They appeared in two World Series, never
posted a losing record and never finished in the second
division.
Boston regularly led the AL in attendance, slipping to second
only when Detroit or the Yankees won. Local TV and radio money
was less important in this era, but Yawkey gradually brought the
Sox to the top of this category, too. Since Baltimore and Oakland
never achieved the rabid popularity the Sox enjoyed, it’s
fair to call Tom Yawkey’s last teams the American
League’s model franchise of the era.
TABLE 2: The Jean Yawkey-Sullivan-LeRoux
Years
1977 |
Record |
Final Position |
Attendance |
Rank |
Media $ |
Rank |
1977 |
97-64 |
2nd in AL East |
2,074,549 |
2nd |
$2,000,000 |
1st |
1978 |
99-64 |
Lost AL East playoff |
2,320,643 |
2nd |
$2,400,000 |
1st |
1979 |
91-69 |
2nd in AL East |
2,353,114 |
3rd |
2,500,000 |
1st |
1980 |
83-77 |
4th in AL East |
1,956,092 |
4th |
$2,600,000 |
3rd |
1981 |
59-49 |
5th in AL East |
1,060,379 |
6th |
$2,700,000 |
4th |
1982 |
89-73 |
3rd in AL East |
1,950,124 |
4th |
$2,700,000 |
4th |
1983 |
78-84 |
6th in AL East |
1,782,285 |
9th |
$3,200,000 |
7th |
1984 |
86-76 |
4th in AL East |
1,661,618 |
8th |
$4,000,000 |
4th |
1985 |
81-81 |
5th in AL East |
1,786,633 |
7th |
$4,200,000 |
4th |
1986 |
95-66 |
Lost World Series |
2,147,641 |
5th |
$4,600,000 |
6th |
During the era of divided control, the Sox basically stagnated.
They still won more games than they lost, but made rhe postseason
only once. That year was a bit of a fluke, too, as Roger Clemens
carried the team to the playoffs on his back. Boston’s
attendance fell after 1979 and never rebounded to its earlier
level, even in 1986, while the Sox’ media money failed to
keep pace.
TABLE 3: The Harrington Years
Year |
Record |
Final Position |
Attendance |
Rank |
Media $ (1987-89)/
Total Revenue (1990-98) |
Rank |
1987 |
78-84 |
5th in AL East |
2,231,551 |
5th |
$6,500,000 |
4th |
1988 |
89-73 |
Lost in ALCS |
2,464,851 |
4th |
$6,600,000 |
4th |
1989 |
83-79 |
3rd in AL East |
2,510,012 |
5th |
Unavailable |
n/a |
1990 |
88-74 |
Lost in ALCS |
2,528,986 |
4th |
$68,700,000 |
3rd |
1991 |
84-78 |
2nd in AL East |
2,562,435 |
4th |
$81,500,000 |
3rd |
1992 |
73-89 |
7th in AL East |
2,468,574 |
6th |
$90,600,000 |
2nd |
1993 |
80-82 |
5th in AL East |
2,422,021 |
4th |
$77,500,000 |
5th |
1994 |
54-61 |
4th in AL East |
1,775,818 |
5th |
$49,900,000 |
5th |
1995 |
86-58 |
Lost in playoffs |
2,164,410 |
4th |
$67,900,000 |
3rd |
1996 |
85-77 |
3rd in AL East |
2,315,231 |
6th |
$88,400,000 |
4th |
1997 |
78-84 |
4th in AL East |
2,226,136 |
7th |
$92,100,000 |
5th |
1998 |
92-70 |
Lost in playoffs |
2,314,721 |
9th |
$106,900,000 |
5th |
John Harrington has run the Sox since 1987, when Jean Yawkey
bought Buddy LeRoux’s general partnership. He obtained
effective personal control of the team upon Jean Yawkey’s
death in early 1992, and sole control after the 1993 season.
Boston’s overall record under Harrington has been worse
than in either of the two previous eras. The Sox have had more
losing seasons in the last seven years than in the previous 25.
Their last appearance in the ALCS came at a high price: Jeff
Bagwell for Larry Andersen
Under Harrington and Dan Duquette, the Sox have been remarkably
inept at public relations. They botched negotiations with Roger
Clemens and Mo Vaughn, angering both men, and nobody’s
believes that Harrington’s efforts to remove vendors from
the area around Fenway were motivated by anything but a desire to
keep fans from buying cheaper food and other items (including
BOSTON BASEBALL) outside the park.
Yet even though the Sox have taken a hard line with their own
star veterans, they’ve done more than any other club to
drive up player salaries. Harrington let Roger Clemens, the best
pitcher in franchise history, leave for Toronto rather than match
the Blue Jays’ offer of $8 million/year for three years.
The next year, after the “washed up” Clemens had won
his first of two Cy Young Awards with the Jays, the embarrassed
Sox signed Pedro Martinez for $72 million over six years. The
Martinez contract -- twice as long as Clemens’ deal, for
50% more money each year -- immediately became the benchmark for
future superstar salaries.
The Sox have also raised the bar for younger and lesser players.
1997 NL Rookie of the Year Scott Rolen was rewarded with a
four-year, $10 million contract from the Phillies; the Sox gave
his counterpart, 1997 AL Rookie of the Year Nomar Garciaparra, a
five-year, $22.25 million deal.
Chills went through executive suites around Major League Baseball
when the Sox signed Jose Offerman for four years and $26 million.
While Offerman’s high on-base percentage makes him more
valuable than his other numbers would suggest, no one could
imagine why a player who’s never been confused with a
superstar could command $6.5 million/year.
The key to the Sox’ future, however, is contained in the
final column of the table. Despite baseball’s highest
ticket prices, and despite playing in one of the AL’s
largest markets and maintaining a rabid fan base throughout New
England, the Sox take in less money than the Yankees, Orioles,
Indians and Rangers. Harrington’s drive to replace Fenway
is motivated by his desire for the added luxury-box money which
has catapulted Baltimore, Cleveland and Texas into the ranks of
MLB’s aristocracy.
But unlike these three clubs, the Sox can’t count on major
public subsidies for a new park. Neither Harrington nor any
independent analyst has identified how the Sox can finance their
estimated $350 million share of construction costs without
crippling the club with long-term debt. The solution could well
involve personal seat licenses, which require season ticket
holders to ante thousands of dollars just for the right to buy
similar seats in the new park -- a move guaranteed to raise howls
of outrage among the club’s most devoted fans.
Harrington’s long-term control of the Sox raises a larger,
more philosophical issue. Why should a man who never invested a
dime of his own money in the Red Sox be allowed to run the club
for as long as he wants? Harrington’s not accountable to
anyone except the Yawkey Estate, which he also controls.
In March, the Boston Herald charged Harrington with
mismanaging the Yawkey Foundations for his own interest. An
investigation by the state Division of Charities found no
wrongdoing, but the fact remains that Harrington’s
continued control of the Sox creates at least the appearance of a
conflict of interest.
The Foundations were created to give away the Yawkeys’
money, not to run a baseball team. Unlike the situation in Kansas
City, where Ewing Kauffmann’s foundation has owned the
Royals since his death to ensure that the club isn’t moved
to another city, the Sox aren’t going anywhere and have no
shortage of potential local buyers. Although Harrington has said
he doesn’t want to sell the club until the new park is
ready, the deals he’ll have to cut to finance New Fenway
could make the Sox less attractive to bidders. So why not cash
out now and let the new owners decide how to build and pay for
New Fenway?
Harrington should put the Sox up for sale after the 1999 season.
If he wants to stay in baseball, his friend Bud Selig should be
happy to create an administrative position for Harrington to
fill. But, having decided that Fenway must be replaced, John
Harrington should let new, better-financed ownership make the
decisions it will have to live with for the next thirty
years.
Copyright © 1999 Doug Pappas. All rights
reserved.
Originally published in the September 1999 issue of Boston
Baseball.
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